ABSTRACT With the rapid development of the Internet technologies, network architectures have been improved continuously. A novel network topology called software-defined network (SDN) has been proposed to enhance the performance of network. Basically, the goals of constructing the SDN network are to achieve faster service deployment, greater flexibility in managing the network, and provisioning while reducing operational costs. So far, most researches have been done to ensure the consistency and reliability on control plane of SDN. However, the consistency and reliability on the data plane of SDN has been neglected. Based on the reasons above, the fault tolerance issue needs to be studied to increase the consistency and reliability of the SDN network. One of the most important problems of fault tolerance issue is the Byzantine Agreement (BA) problem. The goal of BA problem is to make the fault-free processors achieving an agreement to ensure the system working normally even if the faults persist. Unfortunately, the traditional solution is not suitable for the SDN network. Hence, the BA problem should be revised under the SDN network. In this paper, the new kind of failure type called path fault is discussed to adapt to real world. It is because that the routing path between source and destination switch may have faulty influence. Subsequently, a path-based agreement protocol is proposed to solve the BA problem to help all the data be transmitted to the destination even when there are some faulty switches exist in the SDN network. Here, the proposed protocol only requires the minimum number of rounds of message exchange and can tolerate the maximum number of faulty paths for ensuring the consistency and reliability of the SDN network.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the Internet technologies, network architectures have been improved continuously. The main challenges are to satisfy the various services of customers by high quality of service delivered by virtualization technologies. An energy-efficient and high-security networking for supporting the multiple concurrent tasks will be of increasing importance.
However, the present networking environment can neither by easily deployment nor scalable. This implies that network operators don't just need a scalable network, but also a brilliant one. Therefore, a novel network topology, SoftwareDefined Network (SDN) [13] , [16] , [21] , [40] - [42] has been proposed and emerged as an efficient network technology to support the dynamic nature of current network functions and intelligent applications while lowering operating costs through simplified hardware, software, and management. The main concept of SDN is to simplify network management by offering programmers to control over the underlying switches from a logically-centralized controller.
In traditional network architecture, each network device is comprising a control plane and a data plane. The control plane is responsible of configuring and managing the device and routing, and the data plane is responsible for forwarding the data according to the rules from the control plane, and the traditional network architecture is shown in Figure 1 . However, the SDN network architecture separates the control plane and data plane of the network. Under the architecture, the centralized controller manages the control plane, and the data plane is only responsible for the packet transmission. In addition, the controller defines the network behavior by software, and the switches have different behaviors based on different demands [13] , [16] , [21] . Moreover, SDN can deploy different network environment quickly without replacing network devices. Thus, SDN can help to reduce the time of deployment, decrease human resources and achieve the network virtualization. The SDN architecture is shown in Figure 2 .
However, in the real situation, the faulty component can influence the communication data to make the function of network topology down. In other words, these faulty switches may do some faulty behaviors to make other switches not to work correctly. Hence, fault tolerance is also an important topic to be studied under SDN network.
One of the most important problems of fault tolerance issue is the Byzantine Agreement (BA) problem [14] . The goal of BA is to make the fault-free processors reaching an agreement to ensure the system work normally even when the faults persist. However, the traditional solution is not suitable for the SDN network. It is because that a large number of message exchanges are necessary under the SDN network which have lots of switches. The process of message exchange is the main load of the entirely procedure and the performance will be reduced. Besides, the consistency and reliability on the data plane of SDN are necessary to be considered. Some relay paths between switches may be influenced by faulty switches or other relay paths. Thus, in this paper, a new failure type which is defined as path-based has been proposed to reduce the number of messages generated when executing the algorithm.
To sum up, to improve the consistency and reliability of the SDN network, a new failure type is defined as path fault in this paper. Based on the reason above, a new Path-based Agreement Protocol (PAP) is proposed to solve the BA problem in this paper. Here, the proposed protocol requires the minimum number of rounds for message exchange and can tolerate the maximum number of faulty paths to ensure the consistency and reliability under the SDN network.
The rest of the paper is organized as following: the previous results about fault tolerance algorithms under SDN network and the concept of BA problem are introduced in Section 2. The environment and the proposed protocol are described in Section 3. The correctness and complexity are given in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 shows the conclusions and future works.
II. PREVIOUS RESULTS

A. PREVIOUS FAULT TOLERANCE ALGORITHMS UNDER SDN NETWORK
Basically, SDN is a novel network architecture, as the goal to achieve faster service deployment, greater flexibility in managing the network, and provisioning while reducing operating costs. Under this new architecture, OpenFlow protocol [1] , [8] , [19] is used to decouple the network control functions and forwarding functions that making the network control become more programmable, and the underlying infrastructure can be abstracted for applications and network services. In other words, the control plane is decoupled by using the OpenFlow protocol to communicate with data plane. Here the control plane is responsible for network management. The data plane which consists of a number of switches is only for forwarding the data to destination according to the flow table.
So far, some researches have been done to ensure the consistency, security and fault tolerance on control plane [5] , [17] . A Byzantine fault tolerance protocol is proposed by EIDefrawy and Kaczmarek [5] under distributed SDN network to tolerate malicious faults in both control plane and data plane. The main concept of BFT-SMaRT consensus protocol is to replicate the original controller to ensure the fault tolerance of entire system. However, the proposed algorithm cannot confirm the correctness of transmission result on the switch.
Subsequently, the communication process of the BFT-SMaRT consensus protocol is shown in Figure 3 . Besides, an algorithm which is called ReQuirement First Assignment (RQFA) algorithm is proposed by Li et al. [17] under multiple controllers SDN architecture. The proposed algorithm can confirm the update of flow tables in each switch even when faulty controllers exist. In addition, this protocol also considered the controller assignment problem to minimize the number of employed controllers and satisfy the security requirements of a given set of switches. Unfortunately, the collected messages are not enough to execute the RQFA algorithm to eliminate the faulty influence. Hence, the overall algorithm could not ensure that the fault-free controllers to reach an agreement. The related process of RQFA is shown in Figure 4 .
According to the research above, the influence of faulty switch of SDN cannot be solved completely. Therefore, we need to propose the new algorithm to improve the reliability and stability of SDN network.
B. BYZANTINE AGREEMENT
Byzantine Agreement (BA) problem which was first studied by Lamport et al. [14] in 1982 is an algorithm that can make all fault-free processors reaching an agreement under the distributed system even when there are faulty processors exist. So far, the BA problem has been studied and revisited under different network architecture to ensure the fault tolerance and reliability for the system, such as Mobile Network, Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), Wireless Ad-Hoc Network (WANET), Mobile Peer to Peer Network, Cloud Computing environment and so on [10] , [12] , [18] , [25] , [28] , and [29] .
Basically, the original BA problem defined by Lamport et al. is assumed as follows:
There are n processors in a synchronous distributed system; where n is constant and n ≥ 4. Each processor can communicate with each other through reliable fully connected network. One or more of the processors might fail, so a faulty processor may transmit incorrect message(s) to other processors.
After message exchange, all fault-free processors should reach a common agreement, if and only if the number of faulty processors t is less than one-third of the total number of processors in the network, or t ≤ (n − 1)/3 .
Besides, when the source processor is fault-free, the agreement is reached, and the final agreement value will be consistent to the source's initial value v s . Furthermore, BA problem is solved when the following constraints are met:
(BA1) Agreement: All fault-free processors agree on a common value v.
(BA2) Validity: If the source is fault-free, all the other faultfree processors should agree upon the value which is the same as the source's initial value, v = v i .
C. FAILURE TYPES
In practice situation, both processors and transmission media may be in failure. Thus, the failure types can be classified into processor (Also mean the switch under the SDN network) failure and transmission media failure [24] , [30] , [31] . The processor failure is a serious problem, and the transmission media failures generate less effect than processor failure.
1) PROCESSORS FAILURE
The symptoms of processor failure are classified into crash, omission, and malicious fault. The crash fault means the processor is break and does not work normally. Besides, processor fails to send or receive a required message on time is called as the omission fault. In the most serious problem, the malicious fault, the processor can do anything arbitrary at any time to disturb the correctness of the overall system. Thus, the behavior of malicious faulty processor is unpredictable and arbitrarily.
In general, there are some vulnerabilities can be exploited by attackers in the data plane which consists of numbers of switches in SDN network, such as software bug, hardware failure, misconfiguration, or attack by hacker. Therefore, a faulty switch may not only lose its normal working ability, but also be maliciously paralyze by some malicious behaviors. Switches which do some behaviors to disturb the network operation are called malicious fault, and it is unpredictable in advance.
The behaviors of malicious switches include [7] , [11] :
Packet drop: Malicious switches drop packet randomly or selectively. Packet swapping: Malicious switches swap the packet which will be forwarded to different destination. Packet modification: Malicious switches change the contents of the packet. These incorrect behaviors will disrupt network communications severely.
2) TRANSMISSION MEDIA FAILURE
The symptoms of transmission media failure are classified into crash, stuck-at, and malicious fault. The crash fault means the transmission media do not work or break. When the values received by processors from a faulty transmission media are always be a constant, this failure is called a stuck-at fault. The malicious fault represents that the behavior of a faulty transmission media is unrestricted and arbitrary. These faulty transmission media will generate the most serious affect in message exchange.
In the SDN network environment, the switches are only responsible for delivering packets. In other words, when the sender passes the packet to the destination, the paths for passing the packet will contain many switches. Therefore, it is not suitable to solve the BA problem in this environment if the proposed algorithm only considers the switches failure or transmission media failure between two switches. To sum up, the proposed algorithm needs to consider that all possible paths for passing the packet may be problematic for some reason. Hence, in this paper, we propose a new type of failure which is called path fault and discuss the agreement problem under this concurrence. The goal of the proposed protocol is to make sure that all fault-free switch can reach an agreement by using the minimum number of message exchange and can tolerate the maximum number of faulty paths even when there exists some path fault under the SDN network. The comparisons between the PAP protocol and previous protocols are shown in table I. The detail of the path fault will be introduced next.
III. PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPT OF PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
In this chapter, the new proposed failure type which is called path fault will be introduced first. The research architecture will be provided in chapter 3.2. After that, the detail of proposed protocol will be given.
A. PATH FAULT
In this paper, the Path-based Agreement Protocol (PAP) is proposed to make sure that all the fault-free switches can reach an agreement even when some faulty switches exist under SDN network. Here, the definition of path fault is as follow: when the source node sends a packet to the destination node under the SDN network, there may exist some available and distinguishing paths for transmitting the packet. Along with each path, there contain some switches and transmission media. When a switch receives the packet from source switch, it needs to forward the packet to others switches which are in the same path. In a practical situation, the switches may be in fault with some reasons, such as:
The switch is influenced by malicious fault. The message is already wrong before it arrived at the switch.
In the first case, the switch forwards the received faulty packet to the next switch. Regardless of whether the following switches are malicious, the forwarding packet will always be influenced. Similarly, the received packet which was influenced by other faulty switches is sent to the next switch in second case. The faulty packet will always affect the next switch. Therefore, the entire transmitting path will be affected and the faulty message of transmit path will be eliminated. Based on the mentioned two faulty situations, the path for transmitting the packet will become faulty, too. Hence, the path fault must be discussed independently.
Before introducing the proposed PAP protocol, some assumptions must be defined to ensure that the protocol can be executed correctly. The assumptions are listed as follows:
Each switch in the network can be identified uniquely. Path: The route for transmitting the packet from the source node to the destination node. Basically, each route can be seen as a path. It may have different paths for transmitting the packet. Along with each path, it contains lots of switches and transmission media. There has P n paths from source switch to destination switch, where P n is a constant and P n ≥ 4. After message exchange, all fault-free switches should reach a common agreement, if and only if the number of faulty paths (f p ) is less than one-third of the total number of paths in the network, or f p ≤ (P n − 1)/3 .
In this paper, the agreement problem is proposed to make all fault-free switches in a n-switches network environment to reach agreement. The last switch of each path i has its initial value v i from source switch and exchange the received messages to other switches in different path. Subsequently, the switches of each path can agree on a set of common values when the following conditions are met:
(BA1 ) Agreement: All fault-free switches agree on a common value.
(BA2 ) Validity: If the source is fault-free, all fault-free switches shall agree on the initial value that the source sent.
The description of environment and detail of concepts will be introduced next.
B. THE NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
Based on the result proposed by Cascone et al. [2] , [3] , Orlowski et al. [22] , the proposed PAP algorithm will be executed under the SDN topology shown in Figure 5 . At first, system will find out the available paths for transmitting the packet according to one-hop neighbor of destination switch rule [23] , and the constructed paths are shown in Figure 6 . Basically, each switch needs to forward the message to one-hop neighbor of destination switch, therefore, the available paths are constructed depending on the connectivity of destination switch. After that, the agreement protocol will be VOLUME 6, 2018 executed to make an agreement, and the algorithm will be introduced as next.
C. THE PROPOSED PATH-BASED AGREEMENT PROTOCOL (PAP)
In this paper, the protocol named Path-based Agreement Protocol (PAP) is proposed to make all fault-free switches achieve a common value even when the faulty paths exist under SDN network. Basically, the messages received from fault-free switches will be the same with others switches on the same path in the proposed PAP. Subsequently, the notations of PAP are shown as follow:
• Let N S be the source switch of transmission.
• Let N D be the destination switch of transmission.
Let N n be the number of destination's neighbors. Let S be the set of neighbors. Let f p be the number of faulty paths. Let P n be the number of transmittable paths.
The purpose of PAP protocol is to make all available paths to reach an agreement in SDN network even when some paths are in faulty. For the reason above, the last switch of path should exchange messages with the last switch of all other paths. Subsequently, ND can collect enough messages from the last switches of all paths. Finally, the function MAJ and function VOTE is applied to ND to compute the decision value to ensure the reliability of transmittable paths. Subsequently, the detail procedure of PAP is explained as Figure 7 .
In first step of PAP protocol, called the preprocessing, the required number of rounds of message exchange need to be computed by = (P n − 1)/3 + 1. Subsequently, the available path is used to explain our procedure for clearly in Figure 8 . Furthermore, in Figure 8 , Path C is assumed in malicious fault between N S and N D . In addition, switch A' is the last switch of Path A and switch B' is the last switch of Path B and so on. The PAP protocol is organized as two phases: The Message Exchange Phase and the Decision Making Phase. The purpose of the Message Exchange Phase is to collect messages from other paths. In addition, the received messages which are collected from N D to be used to determine the final agreement value in the Decision Making Phase.
In the first round of Message Exchange Phase, N S sends its initial value to all paths, and then receiver switch stores the received value in the root of its message-gathering tree (mgtree) [28] is shown in Figure 8 . The mg-tree is a tree structure used to store the received messages in the Message Exchange Phase. After the first round of Message Exchange Phase (σ > 1, where σ is the number of rounds being executed), the last switch of each path transmits the value at level σ − 1 in its own mg-tree to the last switch of other paths.
In the second round, the last switch of each path broadcasts the root's value of its mg-tree to others and itself. If Path A transmits a message val(s) to Path C, then Path C store the message, which is denoted as val(sa), in vertex sa of its mg-tree as shown in level 2 of Figure 9 . On the other hand, if Path C transmits a val(sb) to Path A, then the message is named val(sbc) and stored in vertex sbc of Path A's mg-tree in the third round as shown in level 3 of Figure 9 . To sum up, the root of the mg-tree is always named s denoting that the stored message is sent from the N S in the first round, and the vertex of an mg-tree is labeled by a list of switch names that the switch name list includes the switch through which the stored message was transferred.
After finishing the message exchange, the system will execute the Decision Making Phase. Here, all paths will send their mg-tree to destination switch (N D ). At this moment, the N D needs to rebuild the mg-tree as shown in Figure 10 . Then, the received mg-trees are combined in new mg-tree. N D gets the majority value from the received mg-trees, and then the majority value will be stored in the new mg-tree, as shown in Figure 11 .
Then, an ic-tree is reorganized from a corresponding mgtree by removing the vertices with repeated switch names in order to reduce the influence from a faulty component repeatedly. Figure 12 is an example of ic-tree by deleting the vertices with repeated switch name. Finally, the function VOTE is invoked to root the value s for ic-tree {VOTE(s) = (sa, . . . , sd) = 1}, an agreement value 1 can be obtained and the Decision Making Phase has completed, as shown in Figure 13 . The algorithm is shown in Figure 7 . Furthermore, some examples will be shown in next subsection.
D. THE EXAMPLE OF PATH-BASED AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
In this section, there is an example to explain the PAP protocol and shown in Figure 14 . There have 7 transmittable paths to send the message between source switch NS and destination switch ND. In this example, PAP protocol requires 3 ( = (Pn − 1)/3 + 1 = (7 − 1)/3 + 1 = 3) rounds of message exchange to agree on a common value. Furthermore, there are seven transmittable paths to achieving agreement.
At first, when the Message Exchange Phase is started, each transmittable path can obtain the initial value from the N S . The source switch N S send the val (1) to N D by all paths. However, some paths received different values from other switches. This is because that some switches may be in malicious fault and sent different values to other switches, and the Schematic is shown in Figure 15 . For illustration, Path D and Path G are assumed to be influenced by malicious fault between N S and N D . Therefore, the message received by Path D and Path G is val(0) and different from the received values of Path A, Path B, Path C, Path E and Path F in the first round. After that, the last switch of each path stores the initial value in the root of its mg-tree in the first round, as shown in Figure 16 .
In the second round of Message Exchange Phase, the last switch of each path broadcasts the root's value of its mgtree to others. Then, the received messages are stored into the corresponding vertices at the level 2 of its mg-tree. After the -th round of message exchange, each last switch can receive -th level of mg-trees from different paths. The received mgtrees of switches A ∼ G are shown in Figure 17 and Figure 18 . After finishing the three rounds of the message exchange, the Decision Making Phase is invoked to obtain a common value. Here, the last switch of each path sends its mg-tree to N D and the mg-trees are reconstructed by taking majority on received mg-trees, as shown in Figure 19 . Subsequently, the function MAJ is invoked to the level of mg-tree, and then the majority value will be stored in the new mg-tree, as shown in Figure 20 . To reduce the cycle influence, a corresponding ic-tree can be reorganized from the mg-tree of N D by deleting the vertices with repeated switch name. The detail of ic-tree is shown in Figure 21 .
The final step of Decision Making Phase, the function VOTE{VOTE(s) = (VOTE(sa), VOTE(sb), VOTE(sc), VOTE(sd), VOTE(se), VOTE(sf), VOTE(sg)) = 1} is used to apply to root s After Decision Making Phase, an agreement value 1 can be obtained and shown in Figure 22 .
IV. THE CORRECTNESS AND COMPLEXITY OF ALGORITHM
In this section, the correctness and complexity will be proved. The first section will prove the correctness of PAP, and the complexity will be proved in the next section. The following lemmas and theorems are used to prove the correctness and complexity of PAP. It can tolerate (P n − 1)/3 malicious faulty paths in a SDN network where P n is the number of paths from source to destination. Furthermore, it only requires (P n − 1)/3 + 1 rounds of message exchange to make all fault-free paths reach a common agreement.
A. CORRECTNESS
To prove the correctness of our protocol, a vertex is called common [6] if each fault-free processor has the same value for the vertex. That is, if a vertex is common, then the value stored in the vertex of each fault-free path's mg-tree or ic-tree is identical. When each fault-free path has a common initial value received from the source in the root of an ic-tree, then an agreement is reached because the root is common. Thus, the constraints, (Agreement) and (Validity), can be rewritten as follows:
(Agreement ): Root s is common, and (Validity ): VOTE(s) = v s for each fault-free path, if the source is fault-free. To prove that a vertex is common, the term common frontier [20] , [32] is defined as follows: When every root-to-leaf path of the tree (a mg-tree or an ic-tree) contains a common vertex, the collection of common vertices forms a common frontier. In other words, every fault-free path has identical messages collected in the common frontier if a common frontier exists in a fault-free path's tree structure (mg-tree or ictree). Subsequently, the same majority voting function can be used to compute the root value of the tree structure and every fault-free path can obtain the same root value due to the same input (the same collected messages in the common frontier). The same computing function causes the same output (the root value).
Since PAP can solve the Byzantine Agreement, the correctness of PAP should be examined in the following two ways:
(1). Correct vertex: Vertex µi of a tree is a correct vertex if Path P ni (the last path name in vertex µi's path name list) is correct. Namely, a correct vertex is using to store the value received from a fault-free path.
(2). True value: For a correct vertex µi in the tree of a correct Path P nj , stored val(µi) is the true value of vertex µi.
By definition, a correct vertex is one that contains a stored value that is received from a fault-free path, and a fault-free VOLUME 6, 2018 path always transmits the same value to others. Therefore, the correct vertices of such an mg-tree are in common. After reorganizing the mg-tree into its corresponding ic-tree by deleting the vertices with repeated path names, the values stored in the correct vertices of an ic-tree are the same. As a result, all the correct vertices of an ic-tree are also in common. Again, by the definition of a correct vertex, a common frontier does exist in the ic-tree as Agreement' and Validity' are true regardless of whether the source is fault-free or has failed if the BA problem has been solved.
Lemma 1: All correct vertices of an ic-tree are common. Proof: After reorganization, no repeatable vertices are in an ic-tree. At the level f p +1 or above, the correct vertex α has at least 2 f p + 1 children in which at least f p + 1 children are correct where f p is the number of malicious faulty paths. The true value of these f p + 1 correct vertices is in common, and the majority value of vertex α is common. The correct vertex α is common in the ic-tree, if the level of α is less than f p + 1. As a result, all correct vertices of the ic-tree are common.
Lemma 2: The common frontier exists in the ic-tree.
Proof: There are f p + 1 vertices along each root-to-leaf path of an ic-tree in which the root is labeled by the source name, and the others are labeled by a sequence of path names. Since at most f p paths can be failed, there are at least one vertex is correct along each root-to-leaf path of the ic-tree. By Lemma 1, the correct vertex is common, and the common frontier exists in each fault-free processor's ic-tree.
Lemma 3: Let α be a vertex, α is common if there is a common frontier in the subtree rooted at α.
Proof: If the height of α is 0, and the common frontier (α itself) exists, then α is common. If the height of α is σ , the children of α are all in common by using induction hypothesis with the height of the children at σ − 1, then the vertex α is common.
Corollary 1: The root is common if the common frontier exists in the ic-tree.
Theorem 1: The root of a fault-free processor's ic-tree is common.
Proof: By Lemma 1, Lemma 2, Lemma 3 and Corollary 1, the theorem is proved.
Theorem 2: Protocol PAP solves the BA problem in a software-defined network environment.
Proof: To prove the theorem, it must show that PAP meets the constraints (Agreement') and (Validity') (Agreement ): Root s is common. By Theorem 1, (Agreement') is satisfied.
(Validity ): VOTE(s) = v for all fault-free paths, if the initial value of the source is v s say v = v s .
Since the most of paths are fault-free, they transmit the messages to all others. The value of correct vertices for all fault-free paths' mg-tree is v. When the mg-tree is reorganized to an ic-tree, the correct vertices still exist. As a result, each correct vertices of the ic-tree are common (Lemma 1), and its true value is v. By Theorem 1, this root is common. The computed value VOTE(s) = v is stored in the root for all fault-free paths. (Validity') is satisfied.
B. COMPLEXITY
The complexity of PAP is evaluated in terms of 1) the minimal number of rounds and 2) the maximum number of allowable faulty paths. Theorems 3 and 4 below will show that the optimal solution is reached.
Theorem 3: PAP requires f p + 1 rounds to solve the BA problem with malicious fault in a SDN network where f p ≤ (P n − 1)/3 + 1 and P n is the number of paths from source to destination.
Proof: Due to the message passing is required in the Message Exchange Phase only. Thus, the Message Exchange Phase is a time consuming phase. Fischer and Lynch [6] pointed out that t + 1(t ≤ (n − 1)/3 ) rounds are the minimum number of rounds to get enough messages to achieve BA. The unit of Fischer is processor [6] , but the unit of the SDN network is path. So that, the number of required rounds of message exchange in the SDN is f p +1 (f p ≤ (P n −1)/3 ). Thus, PAP requires f p + 1 rounds and this number is the minimum.
Theorem 4: The total number of allowable faulty components by PAP is f p malicious faulty paths, where f p ≤ (P n − 1)/3 .
Proof:
The maximal number of allowable faulty components to reach BA underlying a fully connected network is f and f ≤ (n−1)/3 [26] . However, the SDN network is path, so we can suppose a processor in Siu et al. [26] as a path in SDN network. Therefore, f ≤ (n − 1)/3 in Siu et al. [26] implies f p ≤ (P n − 1)/3 in SDN network. Therefore, the total number of allowable faulty components by PAP is f p malicious faulty paths.
As a result, PAP requires a minimal number of rounds and tolerates a maximal number of faulty components to reach a common agreement with fault-free components. The optimality of the protocol is proven.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
Software-Defined Network (SDN) is an efficient network technology to support the dynamic nature of current network functions and intelligent applications. However, the related algorithms for fault tolerance is only discussing in control plane and cannot ensure that each fault-free component to obtain a common value. The consistency and reliability on the data plane of SDN are necessary to be considered. Thus, in this paper, a new failure type which is defined as path fault has been proposed to reduce the number of messages generated when executing the proposed algorithm, PAP.
As a result, the proposed PAP protocol requires minimum number of rounds for message exchange and can tolerate maximum number of faulty paths to make the destination switch getting fault-free decision. In other words, the overall network environment can have better execution environment after applying the proposed PAP protocol.
In the future, the fault diagnosis can be invoked to eliminate the faulty switches. As a result, the round of message exchange can be reduced. Then, each fault-free switch can maintain the performance, integrity and reliability of the SDN to provide a steady environment.
